An independent defence and security policy
- Security through détente, diplomacy and military defence.
Ambition Sverige wants to build a secure, independent and non-aligned Sweden where security rests on its own strength, diplomacy and capacity for détente, not on foreign military presence or supranational great power alliances.
Security policy through diplomacy and independent strong military defence
Sweden's foreign policy has undergone a dramatic shift from a long tradition of non-alignment and peacemaking diplomacy to a clearly confrontational stance within the framework of NATO and the EU. By allowing the US to operate military bases on Swedish soil, Sweden has made itself a potential target in a great power conflict. This means that we are no longer outside the tensions between nuclear powers, but have actively taken a stand in a geopolitical conflict where Sweden's interests risk being overshadowed.
The EU, which once built its legitimacy on a peace project, has evolved in an increasingly militarised direction. Both the Union's and NATO's leadership openly express themselves in terms of rearmament and prolonged confrontation with Russia. In this climate, diplomacy is being pushed aside in favour of a permanent state of war. Ambition Sverige believes that this is a dangerous short-term path, where Sweden's long-term security is sacrificed for the interests of other powers.
A return to a traditional Swedish autonomous line
We advocate a return to a foreign and security policy based on détente, non-alignment and an independent Swedish defence.
Sweden should have effective diplomatic relations with all countries, including those where there are disagreements. History has shown, not least during the Cuban Missile Crisis, that diplomatic and personal contacts between national leaders can be crucial to avoid catastrophic armed conflicts.
Unfortunately, our and Europe's leaders have shown the opposite.
The DCA and NATO membership
Sweden must be able to defend itself. Having an armed foreign military force on Swedish territory in peacetime is not compatible with non-alignment.
The DCA agreement authorises the United States to use Swedish territory for the deployment of weapon systems in which nuclear-armed medium-range missiles cannot be ruled out. This makes Sweden a prioritised preemptive target in a great power conflict. The DCA must be cancelled immediately.
The problem with NATO is that Swedish territory can be used as a staging area for NATO troops in military conflicts not directly involving Sweden. This further contributes to the risk that Sweden will be one of the first targets in a major power conflict.
By its own decisions, Sweden has increased the threat of war
Swedish arms exports to Ukraine, entry into NATO and the DCA have together contributed to a marked deterioration in Sweden's security situation. Authorities such as MUST, FRA and FOI realised early on that Russia's invasion of Ukraine did not in itself mean an increased threat to Sweden. It is therefore worrying that all parliamentary parties, regardless of ideological affiliation, seem to have a common desire to pursue a confrontational defence and security policy. Ambition Sverige believes that this path is strategically risky, both in terms of security and economically.
Sweden has donated a lot of resources, both material and financial, to Ukraine since the war started. Support for Ukraine must now cease in order to fully prioritise the rearmament of Swedish defence and to reduce the threat to Sweden.
Sweden's security is best built by standing outside military blocs, with the aim of keeping the country out of future conflicts. Over 200 years of peace, non-alignment has proven to be a successful security strategy. We want to see a continuation of this tradition.
Sweden's future defence
The world is changing and with it the way wars are fought. This must be reflected in how we shape both our defence and security policies.
Today's conflicts are often hybrid in nature, involving cyber attacks, psychological operations and other non-traditional forms of attack. This means that Swedish defence must be robust and adaptable to these new threats.
Sweden will take advantage of new technologies, innovation and lessons learned from ongoing conflicts in its defence planning, such as how drones, artillery and electronic warfare have proven to be more decisive than tanks and air forces.
We advocate a defence that is based on both popular support through conscription and professional competence through professional soldiers. This creates a defence that is both broad and pointed with popular support but which at the same time guarantees high competence.
Today, Sweden's defence force is considerably smaller than it was just a few decades ago. However, restoring the old invasion defence is neither realistic nor appropriate. Instead, we must build a flexible and modern defence based on small, mobile units with high firepower that can operate with precision and endurance.
The Swedish defence industry has a crucial role in this work. The government should ensure that our defence orders are designed to strengthen the ability and capacity of the domestic defence industry to produce the equipment that Swedish defence needs. This benefits Sweden.
Armed forces and civil defence
The collective capacity of civil society must be mobilised and managed in the event of a crisis or attack, not least for the protection of strategic functions and infrastructure. We see a need for a comprehensive upgrade of our healthcare capacity, our protection of critical infrastructure and our coordination of actors such as coastguards, customs, police and emergency services. Sweden must be able to withstand prolonged disruptions and crises, whether caused by external or internal attacks.
The defence forces and civil defence as a whole need to be rapidly assessed and fundamentally changed based on the totally different tactics and strategy developed in the Ukrainian war.
The Home Guard is an important part of Swedish defence and should therefore be strengthened in line with the overall rearmament of the armed forces. The Home Guard should therefore also be given resources to provide new technical tools such as drones and anti-drone technology.
Resources such as the hunter corps and other firearms licence holders are important elements in the defence of Sweden. Therefore, licensed gun owners should be allowed to possess semi-automatic weapons to the extent they need without the involvement of the state.
The domestic threat
Last but not least, we see a serious threat in domestic insecurity. A sovereign state must control all parts of its territory. If the state does not have the monopoly of violence, it means that some other party has the monopoly of violence - therefore the state is not in control. The state must regain control over the 59 so-called vulnerable areas where it has lost control. The rule of law regaining the monopoly on violence in these parts of the country is a prerequisite for the whole of Sweden to be covered by both a functioning total defence and internal security.
Executive summary
Ambition Sverige wants to build a secure, independent and non-aligned Sweden where security rests on its own strength, diplomacy and capacity for détente, not on foreign military presence or supranational great power alliances.
Ambition Sverige will work for:
- Sweden's security is safeguarded through non-alignment, diplomacy and détente.
- Sweden is building a strong defence force.
- Military aid to Ukraine is cancelled because it increases the threat to Sweden.
- The DCA is cancelled immediately - Sweden will not have foreign troops on its territory.
- Licensed gun owners should be allowed to use their weapons without government interference.
- Sweden is taking control of the monopoly on violence in all ”vulnerable areas”.